Current Situation and Perceived Needs for Head and Face Protection in Humanitarian Demining by Smith, Andy
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
Volume 2 
Issue 1 The Journal of Humanitarian Demining Article 4 
December 1998 
Current Situation and Perceived Needs for Head and Face 
Protection in Humanitarian Demining 
Andy Smith 
Humanitarian Mine Action Specialist 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, 
Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and Conflict 
Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Smith, Andy (1998) "Current Situation and Perceived Needs for Head and Face Protection in Humanitarian 
Demining," The Journal of Humanitarian Demining : Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol2/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction by an 
authorized editor of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu. 
1/5/16, 3:55 PMCurrent Situation and Perceived Needs for Head and Face Protection in Humanitarian Demining, by Andy Smith (2.1)
Page 1 of 15http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/2.1/smith.htm
Current Situation and Perceived Needs for





Information in this issue may be out of date. Click here to link to the most recent issue.
The safety equipment used in humanitarian demining in developing countries would be
considered inadequate by any Western army engaged in combat demining or explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) work. No set of standards is imposed and the standards that
have arisen are surprisingly low. There is no widely accepted need for better protective
equipment, but demining organisations do seem to be slowly levelling-up in the
equipment that they use. Very few demining groups routinely wear hel
mets. Those demining groups that are concerned about head protection usually favour a
30cm high full-face visor hanging on a head-harness (or head-frame). The visor provides
some protection to the throat as well as to the side of the head.
Figure 1: HALO Trust deminer in Cambodia, wearing 5mmpolycarbonate visor.
In this paper I present an overview of the current situation in humanitarian
demining, explain how it has arisen, and then summarise the arguments that are
used to justify it. I go on to identify the standards that are evolving, and suggest
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design requirements for the provision of equipment best suited to meet the perceived
needs.
1. Current equipment provision and United Nations standards
Humanitarian demining is usually carried out by groups of indigenous
deminers who use Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and
equipment that are hurriedly adopted when their group starts to work in
the country. Demining groups, whether commercial, UN-backed or
charitable non-government organizations (NGOs), are usually managed
by soldiers drawn from the armed forces of UN member countries, or ex-
soldiers drawn from the growing pool of experienced demining
organisers (offering their services at commercial rates). With
management sharing similar backgrounds, it is not surprising that
humanitarian demining practice does not vary a great deal around the
world. Below follows a brief summary of the demining process,
undertaken after the extents of the mined area have been decided and
work has begun.
1.1 Summary of the manual demining process
Undergrowth is usually removed by hand as the deminer progresses,
although mechanical means of removing undergrowth in advance of the
deminer are beginning to be used (examples are HALO Trust in
Cambodia, Menschen gegen Minen MgM in Angola, and Mine-Tech in
Bosnia). With the undergrowth removed, mines and ordnance are
located by eye or by using a metal detector whenever possible. When
that is not possible, mines are detected by prodding the ground with a
probe. If the ground is too hard, the ground is scraped rather than
probed, as is common practice in highland Afghanistan. * Prodding and
probing are generally carried out in a kneeling (or on one knee) position.
This is true even when the official SOP of the group requires that the
activity be carried out lying prone. When a mine has been detected it is
carefully exposed. Most groups expose just enough to identify the mine
and lay a charge beside it. Some groups, such as Norwegian People’s Aid
(NPA), Compagnie Francaise d’Assitance (COFRAS), and Conseil
International de Development (CIDEV), routinely expose the whole
mine, lift it with a small grappling hook from a safe distance to check for
booby traps or smart fuses, then defuse the mine for destruction later. **
In most cases common unexploded ordnance (UXO) is dealt with
routinely by field personnel, although most groups have an ex-patriot
EOD man who can be called in to deal with unknown or damaged finds.
1.2 High-risk times
Every specialist in the field has an opinion over when the greatest risk of
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injury occurs and many of those opinions conflict. For example, one may
say that laying the charge beside a mine is a time of high-risk, while
another will say that it is a time of high concentration, so low-risk. No
comprehensive study of accident data has been made, and (in my
experience) accident data are often recorded in a way that would not
facilitate such a study. From my field research, I believe there are two
main times when a deminer is at risk. These are when walking in an area
believed to be safe and when probing to investigate a detector signal (or
probing when a detector cannot be used). The first should never happen
and only full body armour would offer some protection, although the
blast would still result in serious injury. The second high-risk time is of
greater concern, because it is taken during a necessary part of current
procedures. Most deminers are kneeling at this time, although some are
lying prone. Those who kneel tend to say it is more dangerous to have
your head close to the blast epicentre (because ear and brain damage can
occur even if wearing a helmet). Those who lie prone tend to clutch their
genitals at the thought of kneeling. The real reason for the prevalence of
kneeling is comfort: deminers may spend hours probing in any one day
and this makes their comfort a major issue.
1.3 UN standards
Having started in most areas as a response to a humanitarian
emergency, demining is often only funded in the short term. Aid
agencies, other NGOs and the UN may all move into an area without any
coordination or long-term strategy. In Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola
and Afghanistan, it has become the UN’s role to act as coordinator, even
though they often lack the authority to control the activity of those
demining groups they do not fund. They seek to establish a working
system, with SOPs, conditions of employment, and insurance, which the
national government can take over as soon as it is able. The ability or
willingness of national governments to take over demining with largely
humanitarian aims cannot be guaranteed. Those governments may have
another agenda, especially after the high priority areas, such as roads,
power lines and industrial areas have been made safe. In Cambodia, the
Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC) is well established and
technically independent of both the UN and the national government. In
fact, the UN and other groups provide technical support and the UN
effectively monitors the funding, probably because outside donors do not
trust the Cambodian government to do so. In Mozambique, the best that
can be said of the government agency (Mozambique National Mine
Clearance Commission, also known as the CND) established to take over
from the UN Accelerated Demining Programme (UNADP) is that it is
"not dynamic" at present. In Angola, the Angola National Institute for
the Removal of Explosive Ordnance (INAROE) and Central Mine
Action Office (CMAO) look like they may develop into another CMAC,
the national government having wholly other priorities. In Afghanistan,
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the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) based in Pakistan’s Islamabad
started from a different base. It was established to coordinate the
activities and funding of Afghan demining groups that already existed
and has never been directly involved in demining itself or involved
Afghan government staff in its management. Nonetheless, it dictates
SOPs and equipment standards to the groups it employs.
Most observers would agree that it should be the UN’s role to impose
minimum standards in humanitarian demining activity, so protecting the
impoverished recruit to demining from unnecessary dangers or
exploitation. Unfortunately, the UN has not been effective at agreeing on
(never mind establishing) standards across the industry. That statement
could be justified with examples of the discrepancy between any UN
recommended demining standard and the field practice of UN teams. In
this context, I will limit my discussion to the UN published standards for
head, face, and eye protection.
The UN publishes International Standards for Humanitarian Mine
Clearance Operations, at
http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/Standard/s-index.htm.
In paragraph 1.5 of this document, the UN minimum standards for
"Personal Protective Equipment" are given as "eye protection and a
jacket," with the standards for the former quoted below.
a) Eye Protection and Helmet. Eye and face protection is to
be provided by the use of a fragmentation visor. The visor
must meet the minimum standard of personal protection
which is to be capable of withstanding a V50 rating (dry) of
450m/s for a 1.102g fragment (refer to STANAG 2920).... A
helmet should be worn unless it compromises the safety of
the operator. It must conform to the same protection
standards as the visor.
b) Safety glasses. When used, safety glasses must be able to
meet the minimum standards of personal protection and be
capable of withstanding a V50 rating (dry) of 450m/s for a
1.102g fragment (refer to STANAG 2920)...
1.4 Use of Helmets
Of the UN demining organisations in developing countries that I have
visited (Cambodia, Pakistan/Afghanistan, Angola, and Mozambique),
only one requires the wearing of a helmet (UNOCHA, Islamabad).
UNOCHA is currently considering a change to full face visors without
helmets in response to a request from Afghanistan Technical Consultants
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(ATC), their biggest Afghan contractor. A few demining NGOs wear
helmets with a visor attached. The most well known of these is the
British NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG). At the time of writing,
MAG deminers probing for mines wear a laminated aramid helmet with
an estimated V50 of 610 m/s. MAG has been considering changing to
full- face visors without a helmet since at least August 1996 and may yet
decide to change; however, by December 1997, MAG has not
implemented the change.
1.5 Eye and facial protection
Most groups around the world wear industrial safety spectacles while in
a mined area. In many cases, these safety spectacles are the only
protective equipment issued. The UNADP in Mozambique now issue
their deminers with low-grade industrial safety spectacles with an
estimated V50 of well under 100m/s and which are reported to have
failed their own crude 1995 in-house test (200g TNT detonated one meter
from the spectacles).
The UN in Angola issued 5mm polycarbonate visors with a V50 of
around 280m/s and these continue to be used by their successor/progeny
CMAO. These visors are also used by HALO Trust and helmet visors of
the same thickness are used by MAG (although the manufacturers of
MAG’s helmet visors claim a suspiciously higher V50).
The UN-supported/advised group CMAC in Cambodia is in the process
of changing to using 4.5mm polycarbonate visors (locally made) with a
V50 of around 260m/s, industrial safety spectacles (with an estimated
V50 of 100m/s) over several years.
The UNOCHA in Islamabad (controlling Afghan demining groups)
imposes a standard with a military helmet and 3mm polycarbonate visor
(under 200m/s). The difference in protection offered by the helmet
(610m/s) and the visor in this case is particularly absurd.
Another major player in the field, NPA, issues 5mm polycarbonate full-
face visors in Angola (280m/s), but industrial safety spectacles in
Mozambique. (NPA Mozambique expressed interest in sourcing 5mm
visors from Zimbabwe in February 1997, but nothing has come of that at
the time of writing.)
From the above it can be seen that no demining organisation in the
developing world imposes the minimum standard for face protection
that the UN recommends. It is worth mentioning that very few of theses
demining organizations use the minimum body protection recommended
either (no UN groups).
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Of the NGOs in demining, the British HALO Trust and MAG use
protection that comes closest to the requirement, but their visors do not
reach the standard. I have encountered demining specialists who are
surprised to hear that the 5mm polycarbonate visor does not provide
good protection against grenade and POMZ fragments. The specialists
had been misled by the sales literature of UK suppliers that refers to
them as "fragmentation" visors. In my experience, they are very
effective at stopping blast and environmental fragmentation from large
explosions (up to 2.5Kg at 1 meter) but are less than reliable *** against
metal fragmentation. They have proved very effective against a range of
blast mines but have been damaged (although not holed) by casing
fragments from bakelite PMNs and MAI-75s. Accordingly, I refer to
them as "Blast visors."
It is disturbing to note that the lowest protection standards anywhere are
those imposed by UNADP in Mozambique. Also, there is no uniformity
in UN equipment from country to country, much less continent to
continent, and the standards in use seem to be adopted without reference
to what the UN itself publishes. In case this paper should appear to be
singling out the UN for criticism, I should emphasise that the UN in
Angola have established standards of face and head protection equal to
those used by any other group in humanitarian demining. The UN in
Cambodia is also improving standards (against CMAC deminer
resistance) for which it deserves significant credit.
2. Why the standards are so low
Humanitarian demining in developing countries bears little resemblance
to combat demining by troops from the developed world. Even so, the
difference in protection offered by the safety equipment requires some
explanation. Reasons that have arisen during my research can be
grouped under two headings: difference in working methods and
difference in culture and economic setting.
2.1 Difference in working methods
The most obvious difference between humanitarian and combat
demining is that humanitarian deminers are not under threat from
hostile fire (humanitarian demining only takes place with the agreement
of all interested parties). Also, the deminer does not have to work under
extreme weather conditions (they often work in extreme heat, but are
usually prohibited from working in wet conditions). Other differences
between humanitarian and combat demining are that (1) deminers only
work in daylight; (2) deminers carry out the same tasks day after day for
up to 8 hours (usually 6); (3) when a device has been found, deminers are
not generally under pressure to work quickly to deal with it; (4)
demining is overt rather than covert, so noise can be made; and (5)
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deminers work at a distance from each other (usually the SOP states
25m or more, but 15m is common practice).
Unlike the combat deminer working under pressure to clear a passage,
the humanitarian deminer has to find every mine and piece of ordnance
over a wide area. The quality assessors frequently demand that every
piece of metal is removed from a cleared area, making it easy to check
with a detector that the work has been done. This makes the work slow
and means that one cannot simply avoid a thicket or dense undergrowth,
canal or ruined building. Every signal must be investigated and days can
pass without a single device being found. Some individual deminers I
have interviewed have not found anything for weeks. In these
circumstances, it is not pressure and adrenaline that cause problems but
the lack of concentration that comes from boredom. Deminers can be
easily distracted and some argue that the discomfort associated with
protective equipment would be such a distraction. Others have argued
that deminers who are protected will take greater risks and there will be
more accidents as a result.
2.2 Difference in culture and economic setting
The above differences justify some variation in standards between the
protection used in combat demining and that found in humanitarian
demining, but not the degree of difference actually in place. To
understand that the different conditions in the country have to be taken
into account. I offer the following as an explanation rather than a
justification. The most obviously relevant fact is that deminers are
usually ex- combatants in the war that has ended. During that war they
were usually poorly equipped, badly and irregularly paid, and subject to
arbitrary and sometimes barbaric discipline. Often “recruited” to the
military as little more than boys, they frequently have little or no formal
education and no training that equips them for civilian life. One reason
for their use as deminers is to remove them from the pool of redundant
soldiers in the area and so reduce the problem of banditry. These
deminers may well have committed atrocities during the conflict and will
almost certainly have both laid mines and encountered mines laid by
others. Without exception, those deminers to whom I have spoken are
glad to have the job because of the secure income (usually in hard
currency) and the kudos attached to both the demining activity and their
association with foreign experts. I have never heard a deminer complain
(even privately) about having inadequate protective equipment.
The cost of equipping a large number of deminers with protective wear
to limit the injury to the few who have accidents has often been cited as a
reason not to provide the equipment. For this to make sense one must be
aware that demining is often put out to contract and the lowest bid
accepted. In purely economic terms, the cost of expensive equipment can
7
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only be justified if donors and insurance companies insist on it. The UN
does not insist on high standards of equipment or insurance (US$2000
maximum cover being high). Consequently, many organisations can
make insurance payouts directly without using third party insurers, so
the requirements of insurance companies are not relevant. Injured
deminers in developing countries, it is argued, are far better off than any
civilian victim in the same area. The civilian will not get any
compensation and will probably have to pay for whatever hospital
treatment they can get. There is a vast difference in the level of insurance
coverage provided for ex-patriot staff and the provision made for locals.
I have heard this justified with the argument that deminers who were
insured for large sums might deliberately suffer serious accidents in
order to place their families on a secure financial footing. Such an
argument may have some validity when the local culture includes a belief
in Karma, but otherwise does look a little lame. The argument that the
deminers consider the current payouts generous carries more weight.
Many people with whom I have spoken have also made comparisons
between the risks involved in demining and those associated with other
activities in the affected country. In some areas, they argue, life
expectancy for ordinary civilians is very low anyway. Others have
observed that the number of road traffic injuries experienced by
demining groups is often higher than the number of mine related
injuries. An even better comparison is between mine related injuries to
civilians and to active deminers, with far greater numbers of civilians
falling victim during any significant time period. Obviously this
relationship will change in any given country as more and more mined
areas are made safe, but in the countries I have visited there are still
large numbers of civilian casualties (about 275 per month are recorded
in Cambodia, for example, and probably many more go unrecorded).
Perhaps the most telling argument for not providing better safety
equipment is the fact that the deminers do not want it. In most cases, I
have found this to be true. Deminers who have to wear body armour and
helmets in high temperatures for long periods complain bitterly. Their
counterparts wearing industrial safety glasses count themselves lucky. In
Cambodia, CMAC is finding it difficult to persuade deminers to wear
full-face visors, never mind body protection. In Mozambique, I met one
deminer who said that only women would need to wear a visor and I
have frequently encountered a similarly macho dismissal of protective
wear, even from the ex-patriot specialist in charge.
3. The growth of a standard
Other demining groups are beginning to take note of HALO Trust’s
standards. The HALO Trust was formed in 1988 and so is the oldest
humanitarian demining group in existence—which may explain why
8
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 4
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol2/iss1/4
1/5/16, 3:55 PMCurrent Situation and Perceived Needs for Head and Face Protection in Humanitarian Demining, by Andy Smith (2.1)
Page 9 of 15http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/2.1/smith.htm
others respect the standards that HALO has slowly adopted (HALO did
not use visors in Cambodia until 1995). However, HALO’s belligerent
management style and public (BBC 1995) support for continued military
mine usage has made the organisation few friends in the demining
industry. That said, the industry is scattered with ex-patriots who started
with HALO, and most specialists respect their men in the field. Several
other groups have noticed HALO’s experience with full-face 5mm
polycarbonate visors and have recently added them to their standard
equipment. HALO has shown that they can be worn for long periods
without a loss of productivity, so leading the way. It is easier for less
experienced demining organisers to follow an established group and so
avoid investing in poorly chosen equipment that ends up on the shelf.
The NGO MAG appears to apply higher standards than HALO with full
body armour, helmet and visor, yet no other group is rushing to copy
them. This may be explained by two apparent inconsistencies in MAG’s
approach. Firstly, in Cambodia last year only the person prodding or
probing was wearing protective equipment. A detector operator in the
next lane was wearing industrial safety spectacles and no body
protection (if the prodder had detonated a fragmentation mine the man
in the next lane might well have been injured). Secondly, MAG’s SOP is
for probing deminers to lie prone, which makes their uncomfortable
body armour seem unnecessarily bulky. I (and others) have suggested to
MAG that the back panel in the body armour seems superfluous, and
pointed out that it also makes it hard to raise the head when lying prone.
Field staff have agreed with some enthusiasm but UK staff have not.
I wore both MAG’s equipment and the HALO Trust’s in Cambodia to
compare the relative comfort. I found that HALO Trust visors and
frontal body armour can be worn in Cambodian heat with minimal extra
discomfort, while MAG’s helmet and close-fitting, high-collar, high-back
body armour was a physical torture, especially when lying down to
probe. Consequently, I am not surprised that MAG’s equipment
standards have not been copied.
The higher end of the standard currently in use is a 5mm polycarbonate
full-face visor hanging on an adjustable head-frame. Untreated
polycarbonate of this thickness has a V50 of around 280m/s and is very
effective against blast. Field organisations report that they pay the
European suppliers of these visors (LBA, UK) about $US100 each for
bulk orders, plus delivery. The Zimbabwean manufacturer (SDL**** of
similar visors (supplied with carrying bags and hats) charges
considerably less (about $US60 for bulk orders).
Most organisations using visors budget to replace them each year, so the
necessary cost per deminer is about $US70 per year. Annual replacement
is necessary because the visors scratch easily: scratch-resistant visors
could be used, but they would be thicker and so heavier if they were to
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offer the same protection. I have encountered one organisation trialing
perspex visors, which I discouraged, and another using visors with bolts
through the face. In both cases these were low-cost alternatives so
demonstrating the preoccupation with price. It is hard to believe that
donors would not support the supply of 5mm polycarbonate visors at
around $US70 each and, if I am right to think this, the argument against
their use because of prohibitive cost fails.
The argument that accident rates increase when the level of protection is
raised cannot be wholly dismissed until a thorough study of accidents in
humanitarian demining has been made, so allowing a comparative study
relating the level of safety equipment to the frequency of accidents under
like conditions to be carried out. The inconsistency and unreliability of
existing data would mean that such a study would have to start by
collecting original data and so take a long time to complete. In the
meantime, it seems safest to presume that protective equipment is a good
thing.
HALO has shown that deminers will accept the need to wear visors and
other groups have begun to copy, so the suggestion that deminers will not
wear them does not hold. There is, however, still some resistance to their
use on grounds of discomfort.
It was the desire to enhance comfort that led me to work on several
“optional extras” for the full-face visor. The first is a cheap and effective
sun hat being worn by an Afghan deminer. The hat is popular and cheap
enough to be adopted. It is certainly more comfortable than wearing a
hat under the visor head-frame. Notice the way that a hat below the
head-frame also raises the visor face and leaves the throat more exposed.
The third photograph shows a visor I designed with a built in solar-
powered fan. The fan is a 12v 90 milliamp CPU fan, silent and cheap, but
it requires a large PV area to power it. The helmet is formed from thin
fibreglass in the prototype but would be thermoplastic in a production
model. It is intended simply to shield the head from the sun and provide
an all-round air gap between the helmet and the head. The visor
provides the protection, being 5mm polycarbonate.
The prototype attracted some interest and I went on to make a much
cheaper and simpler 4V 45 milliamp clip-on solar fan for full-face visors.
In field trials in Angola the deminers were very enthusiastic about the
clip-on fan but in fact it was pretty ineffective in high humidity. Not
wishing to promote something purely for its novelty value, I have not
tried to get backing to establish production of this item. There may be
scope for someone to develop a simple, higher powered alternative, but
battery-powered versions should be avoided. A deminer is often paid
$US5 or less a day, making the cost of an imported battery significant.
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Cheap, robust and reliable solar battery chargers might make such an
option viable.
Figure 2: An Afghan deminer (ATC) with an SDL visor
[back to reading]
Figure 3: A UN deminer in Angola wearing an LBA visor
[back to reading]
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Figure 4: SDL visor with helmet and fan
[back to reading]
Figure 5: SDL visor with clip on solar fan
[back to reading]
4. Conclusions and prospects
It is possible that the UN and demining donors will force a rapid
improvement in equipment standards, but this seems unlikely to happen
quickly. It seems self evident that the current standards published by the
UN are too high to be achieved in a single stage of equipment upgrade.
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In any case, the current UN standards are unlikely to ever be considered
“appropriate” by workers in the industry. When standards do improve,
lightweight and comfortable wear, designed for non-combat use, should
be available.
In the meantime equipment designers and suppliers should recognise the
current constraints as need as perceived by the deminer community and
low unit cost.
The deminer community’s perception could be manipulated if the will
were there. It is easy to imagine how deminers could be persuaded of the
need to use better equipment by the persuasive force of professional (and
graphic) video images and slick presentations. However, this would be
expensive and no one seems inclined to do the work without proof of its
benefits or a guarantee of payback through sales.
The cost constraints are dictated by the demining supervisors and
controllers — often ex-patriots struggling to balance budgets. They, in
turn are. constrained and have little room for manoeuvre. No matter
what their personal opinion may be, new equipment usually has to show
a payback in enhanced performance or in credibility with their funders.
Improvements that cost a few dollars per deminer may be adopted quite
quickly (as with simple handtools, sunhats or safety spectacles).
Improvements that require a major investment in order to equip a large
number of men are less likely to pass through the system at all.
There is some evidence to suggest that deminer-opinions could be a
deciding force. Deminers went on strike in Mozambique to force the
UNADP to honour previous agreements over pay and conditions and
won, so it is possible that their opinions on equipment would carry
weight.
From my experience, to convince deminers of the need for any new
equipment it must be shown to make their work easier and/or quicker. If
the latter, it might also find favour with their controllers. On the face of
it, protective equipment seems unlikely to meet this requirement, but the
protective-wear industry could take up the challenge and surprise us all.
I expect 5mm polycarbonate full-face visors to become the industry
standard for head/face protection in the next two or three years. When
that has happened, the issue of body protection will come to the fore. A
deminer who kneels to probe for mines is exposing his thighs, genitals,
body and arms to possible blast damage. The challenge to equipment
designers is to offer cheap protection that deminers will wear. And of
course, any answer is likely to be a compromise between cost, comfort
and safety (just as 5mm polycarbonate visors are a compromise). Only
after the need for basic body protection has been met will the industry
give serious consideration to the need to stop high velocity projectiles,
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and so consider upgrading head and face protection.
* Leading to an apparently high incidence of scraping across the top of PMN pressure
plates with predictable results.
** Those who defuse and dismantle mines can find the explosive useful when they
subsequently destroy mines and UXO in a safe place. This is particularly so shortly after
demining groups first arrive in a country with a ruined infrastructure when the supply of
imported explosives and other equipment can be difficult.
*** In my tests against mines in the field, 5mm visors have been severely damaged (2.5cm
holes) by POMZ fragments at 1 meter but have also resisted all strikes from the same
kind of mine at 0.65m. (My field tests have been conducted with the visor supported at
65cm from the edge of the mine, 30º away from vertically over it: this is fairly
representative of its position when being worn by a kneeling deminer who probes directly
only a pressure plate. In the case of the POMZs, the stake’s point of entry to the ground
represented the mine’s position for measurement purposes.)
**** As part of a charitably funded technology transfer programme, I helped SDL to
start manufacturing these visors and have carried out frag and blast tests on them,
comparing them with LBA versions. The results leave me confident that they offer at least
as much protection as the European models, and are ergonomically better suited to use in
humanitarian demining. I also carried out a similar technology transfer programme in
Cambodia last year, when disabled mine victims from Veterans International were
trained in visor manufacture.
Biographical note: A.V.Smith
I have been working on protective equipment for humanitarian
demining for several years, sometimes as manager of the University of
Warwick’s “Mine-clearance support programme,” and also with the
University of Western Australia (I no longer work with Warwick). My
work has involved research and product development, the commercial
introduction of protective products in the field (commercially exploited
by local manufacturers rather than myself). I have undergone training
courses with the British Royal Engineers (RE) and received field
instruction from several demining groups. I have organised (and
frequently implemented) blast tests on equipment against real mines
with MgM, CMAC, the Zimbabwean army, NPA, MAG, and HALO,
and against PE4 based simulations with the British RE. My work has
involved spending time with demining groups in the field and conducting
formal and informal interviews with specialists and deminers,
supervisors and managers. I have spent time in mined areas in
Mozambique, Angola and Cambodia, and interviewed deminers on the
Pakistan/Afghanistan border.
Prior to working on mine-clearance, I worked for several years as a
development engineer and trainer on projects in rural Africa. I am
formally trained as a teacher (PGCE) and am an experienced designer,
researcher and technical trainer, as well as a competent all-round
technician. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the
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